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Abstract 
In this paper we intend to perform an empirical evaluation of the evolutionary game theory 
model of the labor market developed by Araujo and Souza (2010). In order to accomplish this 
task we focus on the Brazilian labor market by using data from the National Household 
Sampling Survey – PNAD/IBGE, from 1995 to 2008. We used four different methodologies: the 
OLS, Pseudo-panel with fixed effects, Instrumental Variables and the Heckman Selection 
Model. Results indicate that the main difference between the 1995-2002 and 2003-2008 period 
is the impact of education over wages. According to these findings, investments in education 
were more profitable for the 2003-2008 period. However, all wage gaps between formal and 
informal markets reduced considerably.  
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1. Introduction 
There are many ways of defining informality and each definition may give rise to a 
different size to the informal market. Such activity may include self-employment, employment 
in micro-businesses or family run activity, as well as employment without appropriate access to 
social protection or formal registration. [see Henley et al. (2009)]. In the present paper we define 
informality as tax avoidance: firms and workers in the informal sector avoid tax payments but 
suffer other constraints such as limited access to legal protection, hedge and credit. Following 
this criteria De Paula and Scheinkman (2007) have estimated that approximately 10% of GDP in 
the United States was produced by individuals or firms that evaded taxes or engaged in illegal 
pursuits. It is also estimated that these activities produce 25 to 35% of aggregate output in Latin 
America, between 13 to 70% in Asian countries, around 15% in O.E.C.D. countries1.   
In this paper we do not treat informality as the result of exclusion but rather as the 
outcome of rational decisions taken by firms and workers. We acknowledge that the issue has 
many dimensions but we focus on the informality that arises as the optimal outcome of rational 
agents playing their best responses in a specific institutional set-up. This view is according to 
Hirschman (1970) who considers that workers and firms make implicit cost-benefit analysis 
when deciding to act in formal or informal sectors and it has found empirical support in a 
number of papers. In Maloney (2004), for instance, informal urban micro-firms can be seen as 
agents that, on behalf of the lack of enforcement, may opt for which degree of formal activity 
they wish to produce. He also observes that, even at lower wages, workers in these economies 
choose informality due to a level of dignity and autonomy that this type of work might offer. 
Following this rationale, Fortin et al (1997) have developed a model with firm 
heterogeneity in which a formal and an informal market emerge in some sectors of the economy 
                                                 
1 The World Bank estimates that this informal economy generates 40 percent of the GNP of low-income nations 
and 17 percent of the GNP of high-income ones. In some industries, such as retailing and construction, informality 
can account for as much as 80 percent of employment.  
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as the optimal response against the effects of taxation and wage controls. By studying the 
informal sector in the Republic of Cameroon, these authors have found that the average wage 
paid in the formal sector is higher than the average wage in the informal sector. This view was 
disputed by Mattos and Ogura (2008) studying the Brazilian economy: controlling for individual 
characteristics it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that wages in the formal sector are 
similar to wages in the informal sector. Besides they have concluded that in the same industry 
more efficient firms are formal while the less efficient ones are informal. They assume that the 
cost of informality increases with production, and this implies that formal firms have a greater 
probability of employing more workers than informal ones.  
While most of these studies focus on informality from the viewpoint of firms Loayza and 
Rigolini2 (2006) found that the size of informal employment is given by the proportion of 
workers whose skills fall below a threshold level where the worker is indifferent between the 
two sectors. They have found that informality not only responds to fundamental, long-run forces 
but also to inter-temporal economic conditions related to the business cycle and transient 
policies. Thus, for example, the informal sector could act as a buffer that expands in economic 
recessions or as an adjustment mechanism during temporarily high tax regimes. Fiess et al. 
(2010) have developed a labor market model and embedded it in a standard macroeconomic 
framework that allows capturing additional information on the sectoral origin of the shocks 
through the real exchange rate — a measure of relative prices of tradables and non-tradables. 
The findings suggest that the pro or counter-cyclicality behavior of the informal sector is more 
complex than that reported by Loayza and Rigolini (2006), since it depends on the sectoral 
origin of the shocks and the presence of binding wage rigidities. They found numerous examples 
                                                 
2 Other papers that investigate causes and determinants of informality include Loayza (1996), Loayza et al (2005a, 
2005b) and Maloney (2004). All of them point to some positive relation between the size of the informal sector and 
higher taxes, more labor market restrictions, and poorer institutions (bureaucracy, corruption and legal 
environment). 
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where either a positive productivity or demand shock to the non tradable/informal sector leads to 
its expansion. 
Albretch et al. (2008) have built a search and matching model to analyze the effect of 
labour market policies in an economy with a significant informal sector. By running numerical 
simulations they found that a severance tax greatly increases average employment duration in 
the formal sector, reduces overall unemployment, reduces the number of formal sector workers, 
and reduces the number of workers who accept any type of offer (formal or informal). A payroll 
tax reduces average employment duration in the formal sector, greatly reduces the number of 
formal-sector workers, and significantly increases the size of the informal sector and the number 
of workers accepting any type of offer.  
In this paper we intend to perform an empirical evaluation of the evolutionary game 
theory model of the labor market developed by Araujo and Souza (2010) by focusing on the 
Brazilian labor market by using data from the National Household Sampling Survey – 
PNAD/IBGE, from 1995 to 2008. According to this modeling workers and firms’ decision to 
engage in the formal or informal sector arise as the outcome of bounded rational decisions based 
not only on the expected pay-offs in each of the sectors but also on the interaction with other 
agents. We must recall that preferences are wide-ranging and can include both pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary aspects of work. In fact, wages and tax schemes although important determinants 
of utility, are not unique. Other factors such as autonomy, flexibility, working hours, distance to 
work and opportunities offered in the informal sector also determine job satisfaction and may 
lead workers to choose informal employment3. 
Our empirical findings show that although wages play an import role in the decision of 
workers and firms all wage gaps between formal and informal markets reduced considerably as 
been pointed out by Mattos and Ogura (2008). However, an increase in one year of study would 
raise the probability of participating in the formal sector while diminishing the probability of 
                                                 
3 For further information see Mulinge and Mueller (1998) and Saavedra and Chong (1999).  
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joining the informal sector. Besides, the skill premium in the formal sector is higher than in the 
informal sector.    
This paper is structured as follows: in the next section we present the model with its 
main properties. Section 3 shows empirical evidence of determinants for labor participation in 
informality in Brazil.  Section 4 brings conclusions to the study  
 
2. Theoretical Model 
The model departs from Araujo and Souza (2010) and corresponds to an asymmetric 
evolutionary game where there are two populations of interacting agents [See Gintis (2000)]: 
workers and firms. It is assumed that each identical worker has two possible strategies that is, 
supply labour in either formal or informal market at each period of time. Let N be the number of 
workers, Nf   the number of workers that choose to supply labour in the formal sector – the 
formal strategy – and Ni be the number of workers that choose the informal sector – the informal 
strategy. Let fn  and in  be the proportions of workers that chooses the formal and informal 
strategies respectively, with 1=+ fi nn . By choosing a strategy does not mean that the worker 
will be employed since to be hired it depends on matching a firm that has chosen the same 
strategy. Otherwise the worker will be unemployed. If she chooses the formal strategy then there 
exists a probability σ, 10 ≤≤σ , of finding a job in a formal firm. In this vein her instantaneous 
expected utility, efU , is assumed to be given by:   
f
e
f wU )1( τσ −=                                                                              (1) 
Where fw  is the real wage discounted by the income tax τ , 10 <<τ . Expression (1) 
shows that if the worker chooses the formal strategy there is no probability of punishment but 
she faces uncertainty related to finding or not a firm that also chooses the formal strategy to hire 
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her, what happens with probabilityσ . However, if the worker decides to act in the informal 
sector his expected utility, e
i
U , is given by4:  
)]()1[( mwwU ii
e
i
−+−= ρρφ                                                          (2) 
Where  , 10 ≤≤φ , is the probability of finding a job in the informal sector and iw  is the wage 
paid in the informal sector. The probability of being caught due to the operation in the informal 
sector is given by  ρ, 10 ≤≤ ρ  . In this case the worker pays a fine, denoted by m, due to the 
choice of acting in the informal sector. These variables are assumed to be exogenous. 
Expression (2) shows that the worker who chooses the informal strategy faces two kinds of 
uncertainty: the first is related to the possibility of not finding a firm that chooses the informal 
strategy and the second is related to the possibility of being caught if hired by an informal firm.  
In order to model the demand side of the labour market, let us assume following the 
literature of search and matching – see e.g. Pissarides (2000) – that the number of firms, denoted 
by L, is equal to the number of workers5, that is L = N. Let Lf be the number of firms that 
chooses the formal strategy and Li the number of firms that chooses the informal strategy. 
Analogous to the case of labour supply, each firm can demand labour in only one of the markets 
in each period of time. Let iη  be the proportion of firms that chooses the informal strategy and 
fη , the proportion of firms that chooses the formal strategy, with 1=+ fi ηη .  
                                                 
4 An important difference between this approach and the one developed by Fortin et al (1997) is that in our model 
we model explicitly the possibility of being caught due to the operation in the informal sector while they consider 
that the firm in the informal sector faces a cost in order to avoid to be caught. The insight is that the higher the 
production of the firm the higher the cost in order to conceal its production. 
5 This is a usual assumption in the search and matching models and here it is adopted for tractability only. For a 
treatment of the labor market dynamics by using an evolutionary model in which the processes of vacancy setting is 
modeled through a process of searching and matching see Fagiolo et al (2004). 
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Following Pissarides (2000) assume that each firm hires only one worker who produces a 
fixed amount of product at a time. The price of the product is normalized to 1 and the amount of 
production in the formal sector is exogenously given by yf. Being θ, 10 ≤≤θ  the probability of 
a firm that chooses the formal sector to find a worker that decides to supply labour in this sector, 
the profit of the firm if it decides to operate in the formal sector is given by: 
])1[( ff
e
f wy −−=∏ γθ                                                                 (3) 
Whereγ , 0 < γ < 1, stands for the costs for being in the formal sector. Expression (3) shows that 
each firm has to pay fyγ  as taxes. Both fy  and γ  are assumed to be exogenous. If there is no 
matching between the formal worker and the formal firm then the profit of the firm is equal to 
zero, what occurs with a probability 1 – θ. In the informal sector the firm is also assumed to hire 
only one worker, but now it produces a smaller amount of product than in the formal operation 
due to limited access to public goods, capital goods etc. Let yi be the amount of product in 
informal operation, with yi < yf. In this vein the profit of the firm in the informal sector is given 
by: 
( )[ ] [ ]{ }ewywy iiiiei −−+−−=∏ ψψλ 1                                                  (4) 
Where λ, 10 ≤≤ λ is the probability of matching a worker in the informal sector,  and ψ , 
10 ≤≤ψ , is the probability6 that the firm faces of paying a fine, expressed  by e, due to the 
operation in the informal labour market. After some algebraic manipulations expression (4) 
yields:  
)( ewy ii
e
i
ψλ −−=∏                                                                   (5) 
                                                 
6 We assume that this probability is the same of finding a worker in the informal sector. This assumption is made 
for the sake of convenience only but it expresses the fact that once a worker in the informal sector is detected then 
the corresponding firm is also found.  
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Since it is assumed that each firm hires only one worker the ratio of labour demanded in 
the formal sector, fη , and the ratio of labour demanded in the informal sector, iη , is 
proportional to the amount of firms in each sector. It is important to recall that if a worker who 
chooses the formal strategy does not match a firm with this strategy – an informal firm – then 
the pay-off of both worker and firm will be equal to zero. In this case the firm is assumed to 
produce zero output and the worker does not earn wage. This situation can be identified as 
unemployment from the viewpoint of the worker. We could assume alternatively that if a worker 
that chooses the formal sector matches a firm in the informal sector then both will obtain 
positive pay-offs but smaller than the pay-offs if both worker and firm choose the formal sector 
or informal sector simultaneously. It is easy to see that this game has two pure Nash equilibria 
namely {f,f} and {i,i} together with a mixed strategy equilibrium, in which both workers and 
firms randomly choose between being formal or informal.  
In order to evaluate the dynamics of entrance and withdrawal of workers in the formal 
market we use a version of the dynamic replicator as proposed by Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003) 
adapted to the study of the labour market according to Araujo and Souza (2010). The dynamic 
movement of workers between the two strategies, namely formal and informal is given by the 
following expressions:   
[ ]ifeff UUNN f ,−=&                                      (6) 
[ ]ifeii UUNN i ,−=&                                                                       (7) 
Where ifU ,  is the average pay-off given by: 
e
ii
e
ffif UnUnU +=, . By inserting 
expressions (1) and (2) into (6) and (7) it is possible to show after some algebraic 
manipulation7 that it yields the following equations for the dynamic behaviour of the ratios 
of workers in the formal and informal sectors. 
                                                 
7 See Araujo and Souza (2010) for the derivation of expressions (8) and (9) from (3) and (4). 
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[ ]{ }mwuwnnn ififf ρφτσ −−−= ])1[(&                                               (8) 
[ ]{ }])1[( fiifi wmwnnn τσρφ −−−=&                                                 (9) 
These expressions show that the central planner can affect the supply of the labour in 
each sector by choosing the taxation, τ, the probability of caught the worker in the informal 
sector, ρ , and the fine to be paid in the informal sector, m. Until this point of the analysis the 
values of σ and  are exogenously considered but a further inquire on this probabilities by using 
a Bayesian inference may show that  fησ = and fηφ −=1 . Remember that firms have only two 
strategies, namely formal and informal. Even in the case where there is no matching between a 
firm choosing the formal strategy and a worker choosing the informal strategy their strategies 
are ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ despite the fact that the worker will be unemployed and the firm will 
produce nothing in that period of time. Hence all firms can be grouped into one of these 
categories: ‘formal’ or ‘informal’. The probability that a worker faces of finding a ‘formal’ firm 
is given by f
f
L
L
ησ ==  and the probability of finding a ‘informal’ firm is given by iiL
L ηφ == . 
Hence expression (8) may be rewritten as: 
[ ]{ }mwwnnn ifffiff ρητη −−−−= )1(])1[(&                                           (8)’ 
Following the same approach for the labour demand, the dynamic replicators for the 
firms are given by: 
 ( )ifefff LL ,Π−Π=&                                                           (10) 
( )ifeiii LL ,Π−Π=&                                                            (11) 
Where efΠ stands for the expected profit of the formal strategy and 
e
iΠ  stands for the expected 
profit of the informal strategy and if ,∏  represents the average expected profit in the economy 
which is the average payoff for firms, given by: eii
e
ffif Π+Π=∏ ηη, . By replacing expressions 
10 
 
(4) and (5) into expressions above and considering that 1 =+ fi ηη  we obtain the following 
dynamic replicator in the simplex form: 
{ }][])1[( mwywy iiffiff ρλγθηηη −−−−−=&                                           (12) 
{ }])1[(][ ffiifii wymwy −−−−−= γθρληηη&                                           (13) 
By following the same rationale adopted for the labor supply it is possible to conclude 
that fn=θ  and fn−=1λ . Expression (12) may then be rewritten as: 
{ }])[1(])1[( mwynwyn iiffffiff ργηηη −−−−−−=&                                     (12)’ 
The equilibrium or steady state solution of the model is obtained by considering that: 
0== ffn η&& . From expression (8)’’ we have three possibilities, namely: 0=fn , 1=fn  or 
0)( =ff η . From expression (12)’ we also have three possibilities, namely: 0=fη , 1=fη  or 
0)( =fng . Hence, from the combination of these possibilities we are left with five possible 
cases that may be expressed as: (i) 0=fn , 0=fη ; (ii) 0=fn , 1=fη ; (iii) 1=fn , 0=fη ; (iv) 
1=fn , 1=fη ; (v) ewywy
ewy
n
iiff
ii
f ψγ
ψ
−−+−−
−−
=
)1(
 and 
][])1[(
][
mww
mw
if
i
f ρτ
ρ
η
−+−
−
= . 
 Araujo and Souza (2010) have shown that the most probable outcome is the fifth 
equilibrium in which the final solution is affected by the parameters chosen by the government 
such as taxation and fines. In the next section we perform an empirical evaluation of this model 
in order to investigate if economic variables such as wages, taxation and fines are the 
determinants of the workers’ and firms’ choices in the labor market. A number of other 
characteristics such as gender and race are also considered.  
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3. Empirical Analysis  
In this section we aim to analyze the main factors that drive the Brazilian labor when 
deciding to participate in the formal or informal sectors. We accomplish this analysis by using 
four different methodologies, ascertaining for sample selection and endogeneity. 
3.1. Data 
The data for this study were obtained at the National Household Sampling Survey – 
PNAD/IBGE, from 1995 to 2008, with an exception to the years of 1994 and 2000, when this 
survey did not occur. The cross-section data were pooled and divided in two periods: 1995 – 
2002 and 2003 – 2008. The sample ranges individuals from 22 to 57 years of age, and the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the real annual income (LOGSALM), deflated by 
consumer prices index – IPCA. The explaining variables in our analysis are: race (WHITE), 
gender, wages (SAL.M), years of study (YOSTUDY), square years of study (YOSTUDY2), 
urbanization index (URBAN), worked hours, union (UNION), formal (FORMAL) and informal 
(INFORMAL) markets, private sector, experience (EXPER) – defined by age less years of 
study, minus six – square experience (EXPER2), experience times education 
(EXPERYOSTUDY). Finally, other variables that can be included in the labor equation appear: 
family reference person (PESREF), age (AGE), square age (AGE2), kids (KIDS), firms with 
less than 11 employees (ESIZE), married man (MARRIEDM) and a dummy to indicate if the 
person lives in an urban area or not (URBAN). 
We defined two sub-samples dedicated to the private sector. The first sample consists of 
298.443 workers for the period of 1995-2002. The second sample consists of 345.032 workers 
for the 2003-2008 period. In each sub-sample, workers were split into formal and informal 
markets. The samples used consist of 219.709 formal workers and 78.838 informal workers for 
the period of 1995-2002; whereas, 259.460 formal and 90.192 informal workers composed the 
sample for the 2003-2008 period. Private sector’s formal workers is composed by formal 
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working contracts while informal labor market is constituted of no contract based employees as 
well as self employment.  
Table 1: Description of variables used in the Heckman selection equation for formal and 
informal labor market 
Dependent Variables: 
FlpF = participation of the worker on formal labor market.  
FlpInf = participation of the worker on informal labor market. 
Explaining Variables: 
Yostudy = Years of study. 
White = 1 if white, 0 otherwise. 
Pessref = 1 if family reference, 0 otherwise. 
MarriedM = 1 if married man, 0 otherwise. 
Exper = Experience = age – education - 6. 
Exper2 = Square Experience. 
yostudy2 = Square years of study. 
Experyostudy = years of experience times education. 
Urban = urbanization index. 
Tenure = years spent at the last job. 
age = age in years. 
Esize= Size of firms with up to 10 employees. 
Age2 = Square Age. 
Union = 1 if associated to union, 0 otherwise. 
Lambda = inverse Mill`s ratio. 
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Table 2: Description of variables used in labor market income equations 
Variables 
Lnwage = Natural Logarithm of wage per worked hour (dependent variable). 
White = 1 if white, 0 otherwise. 
MarriedM = 1 if married man, 0 otherwise. 
Exper = Experience = age – education – 6. 
Exper2 = Square experience. 
Yostudy = Years of study. 
Experyostudy = Years of study times education. 
Esize = Size of Firm with up to 10 employees 
Kids = 1 if family have kids, 0 otherwise. 
Lambda = inverse Mill’s ratio. 
 
3.2. Descriptive analysis 
Assessing if there were any substantial changes in the private sector related to the formal 
and informal labor markets between the two sub-periods under analysis, we present the 
descriptive statistics on Table 1. First, we divided the samples into three different groups 
according to their age: group1 is an array containing individuals from 22 to 33 years of age; 
group2 goes from 34 to 45 years; group3 ranges individuals with 46 to 57 years of age.     
For the years of 1995-2002, group1 presents a wage differential between formal and 
informal workers of 22,19%, equivalent to a R$97,83 surplus. For group2, however, the wage 
differential is not so deep being only 3,40% higher than informal workers’ wages. Group3 
shows a mean of 18,22% higher wages for formal sector laborers, representing a R$92,84 gain 
for formality. 
Analyzing the 2003-2008 period, group1’s formal laborers obtain 20,32% higher wages 
than informal workers, representing a mean wage of R$ 812,16, in contrast to a R$ 675,01. 
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Thus, formal workers receive a R$ 137,15 bonus for legality. Group2, however, presents a lower 
differential for legality, such as in the first period’s analysis. Here, formal workers have only a 
surplus of R$ 83,21, being formal wages 10,83% higher than informal ones. In the third group, 
the differential in wages rises, where formality shows a gain of 20,08% over informality, 
presenting a R$ 866,38 against a R$ 745,24. These findings contradicts the prediction of the 
model proposed by Rosen (1986), in which average earnings should be higher in the less 
desirable informal sector to compensate for the non-pecuniary benefits granted to registered 
workers and reinforces the findings of Fortin et al. (1997).   
Here we might be observing the life cycle working over differential gains of 
formality/informality. Youngsters, or group 1, have problems in entering the labor market and 
therefore accept greater gain differentials due to job opportunities in either markets. They are 
also in the period of gaining experience and education in counterpart to monetary gaining 
objectives. On the other hand, group 2 is at the age of capturing money for later consumption, 
thus they are less willing to accept wage differentials. In this group we may be observing 
voluntary informality, and not the traditional view that informality is due to the lack of formal 
jobs. Members of group 3 are closer to retirement. Thus, many  might face difficulties in finding 
a formal placement due to their age. Therefore, wage differentials among formal and informal 
jobs are to be expected.  
The results show that in the last six years, the gap between formal and informal wages 
grew, what indicates that Public Welfare revenues increased. According to Gobetti and Orair 
(2010), fiscal revenues increased 1,93% during the 2003-2008, going from R$ 542.863 million, 
in 2003, to R$ 1.047.194 million in 2008. Despite the increase in gross base product for 
taxation, relative taxation burden augmented from 31,93% in 2003 to 34,85% of the GDP in 
2008. Formal workers’ real mean wages for all three groups of the 2003-2008 period are higher 
than those of the precedent period.  
15 
 
We must conclude, thus, that the gap increase among formal and informal wages is related 
to Brazilian economy’s growth. Despite the increase of labor participation in the public sector, 
the wage gap among formality and informality remains significant. We can realize that when 
there is economic growth, the burden of being in the informal sector also grows, represented by 
the increase in the wage gap in the latter period analyzed. Thus we can perceive that access to 
public services becomes more relevant. It is also true that the size of the production with 
economic growth increases, which makes it easier for public monitoring to seize those who are 
under informal activity. Thus informal firms must remain small. As such, a 2,6% increase in the 
mean value for firm size (esize) with up to 10 employees is observed for the informal market, 
for the 2003-2008 cycle . Table 1 shows a 50,1% growth in the mean informality wage, what 
represents greater interest of small firms for the execution of smaller projects. 
Descriptive statistics of table 1 also show that great part of younger workers – group1, are 
more present in informality for both periods. This represents that 56% of informality is in 
group1 in the first period and 55% in the second one. Group2, nonetheless, is more concentrated 
on formal market in both periods. As such, we tend to believe that, as age increases so does 
human capital, increasing formal market opportunities.  
One of the most relevant variables for determining wage is education. When assessing 
table 1, we verify that education increased for both markets. Among formality, average years of 
education went from 7,99 to 9,24 in 2003-2008, whereas, in informal markets, the average went 
from 6,55 years to 7,78. When evaluating experience impact on data, we observe that, for the 
first period, formal workers possess 19,12 years, while informal workers had 20,05 years. In the 
second period of analysis this gap is reduced to 18,09 years for formal and 18,97 years for 
informal workers. However, it is interesting to note that experience’s mean fell. 
It is also observable from table 1 that the concentration of male workers is considerably 
higher in the formal sector for the 1995-2002 cycle, representing 67% of formal labor force. 
This massive participation continues for the second period, despite reducing to 64%. This male 
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predominance also presents itself in informality for both periods analyzed. The participation of 
non-white individuals in formal and informal labor markets showed an increase from the first to 
the second period analyzed. We can verify that white participation fell from 58% to 53% in 
formality and from 49% to 44% in informality.  
Tenure in formality is higher than in informal markets. Under formality, tenure is around 
five years for both periods; while under informality, this value reduces to 3 years. In the 1995-
2002 period, only 30% of formal workers were associated to union. This value grew 
considerably in the 2003-2008 cycle, where 45% of these laborers were under union filiations. 
Informal sector, however, presented only 5% filiations for both periods. 
  
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics – Formal and informal markets for periods of 1995-
2002 and 2003-2008. 
  1995-2002 2003-2008 
  Formal Informal Formal Informal 
  Mean sd mean Sd mean sd mean sd 
salm 582.07 748.55 386.10 597.80 870.49 1016.89 747.25 1212.93 
yostudy 7.99 4.01 6.55 4.13 9.26 3.80 8.31 4.47 
exper 19.12 10.41 20.05 10.77 18.08 10.63 18.20 11.38 
exper2 474.04 474.32 518.09 511.45 439.68 464.64 460.51 502.77 
experyostudy 130.35 84.42 108.61 84.19 145.01 92.20 121.79 94.89 
esize 0.77 0.42 0.35 0.48 0.77 0.42 0.36 0.48 
kids 0.21 0.41 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.40 
white 0.58 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.45 0.50 
marriedM 0.57 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.40 0.49 
yostudy2 98.51 74.45 75.19 69.98 120.78 73.63 107.41 82.42 
age2 1245.77 650.39 1218.48 686.31 1280.35 677.65 1442.38 783.23 
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age 34.18 8.81 33.65 9.27 34.61 9.09 36.59 10.19 
experyostudy 130.35 84.42 108.61 84.19 145.01 92.20 121.79 94.89 
union 0.30 0.46 0.05 0.22 0.28 0.45 0.10 0.30 
pessref 0.56 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.42 0.49 
urban 0.96 0.20 0.93 0.26 0.96 0.21 0.86 0.34 
group1 0.53 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.44 0.50 
group2 0.34 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47 
group3 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.34 0.15 0.36 0.23 0.42 
male 0.67 0.47 0.70 0.46 0.64 0.48 0.51 0.50 
female 0.33 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.49 0.50 
tenure 5.07 5.65 3.52 5.15 5.18 5.79 6.59 7.92 
 
3.3. Estimation 
The econometric methods applied in this study are well known in the education return 
literature. The econometric equations are distinguished in four different estimation methods. The 
first estimation method is an OLS – ordinary least squares, which we use to compare to the 
other estimations.  
However, there exists bias in the common OLS estimation of education impact over 
wages. This bias occurs through two main channels: individual ability or sample selection. The 
first bias, the individual ability issue, is due to the unobserved variable, that cannot be measured, 
and that influences individual’s gains. This unobservable variable is consisted of abilities such 
as intelligence, motivation and dedication. To control for this bias, we use a second estimation 
model: pseudo-panel8. 
Heckman (1979) states that even if OLS methodology presents relevant results, there 
always lies a chance of these estimates being biased due to the omission of some regressors. 
This Pseudo-panel methodology also controls for this unaware omission. The Pseudo-panel 
                                                 
8 The empirical treatment was based on pseudo-panel methodology used in Deaton (1985). 
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estimation can be done basically in two ways: (i) with a random effect, where the unobservable 
variable is random and the estimation is through a Feasible general least square, (ii) or through a 
Fixed effect model, where the unobservable variable has to be controlled for. To decide whether 
to use a random or fixed effect modeling, we apply a Hausman test. According to these results, 
the null hypothesis, that the fixed effect is not correlated to the explaining variables, is rejected 
and thus we use a fixed effects model.  
However, even when controlling for unobserved effects, there may be an endogeneity 
problem within the estimation. When endogeneity is present in the explaining variable, caused 
by correlation between the error term and the explaining variables, the use of a third method to 
control for this bias is indicated: the instrumental variable method (IV). We then also apply 
this method, checking for endogeneity through a Sargan test. 
According to Heckman’s (1974, 1979) studies, the individual’s decision for participating 
in the labor market depends on a reserve wage. The worker decides to accept a job offer, that is, 
decides to participate in the labor market if the wage offered is able to cover his opportunity cost 
of working, the reserve wage. However, in order to correct the sample selection bias caused by 
supply and demand of labor, we estimate a fourth equation, the Heckman selection model.  
Ordinary Least Squares 
The first estimation model we use is a Ordinary least Square. The OLS model can be 
obtained as follows: 
iiiij xw εβα +Σ+=ln                                         (13) 
Where lnwij is the logarithm of worker’s i wage in the j labor market; α is the intercept; x 
is the vector of individual characteristics; βi are parameters to be estimated and εi is the random 
error, independently and identically distributed. 
Pseudo-Panel with fixed effects 
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The main objective of fixed effects is to control for specific characteristics of individuals, 
that are invariant in time. This method also allows reducing the bias over non specified 
independent variables. The intercepts αi vary only from individual to individual and is able to 
capture all different characteristics along time. We admit that there are many unobserved 
characteristics that influence individual’s economic performance, such as intelligence, 
motivation and dedication that are very difficult to measure and that are not easily instrumented 
for9. 
A way to evaluate whether to use a fixed effects model or a random effects model is using 
a Hausman test. In this test, we evaluate if the unobserved variable are correlated to the 
independent variables or not, that is, it tests for the presence of endogeneity. This test is 
constructed as follows: 
Null Hypothesis: [ ( ) 0=Ε itxiα : non correlated].  
Alternative Hypothesis: [ ( ) 0≠Ε itxiα : correlated]. 
Once we rejected the null hypothesis in our data, we found that the use of random effects 
is inappropriate for estimating wages. We thus use a fixed effects modeling in the pseudo panel. 
The fixed effects model is the following: 
( ) itetitxiity +++= λβα 'ln               ( )Ttni ,....,1;,......2,1 ==                            (14) 
where yit is a wage vector. The vector of observable individual charateristic is represented by Xi; 
t measures time and n is the number of individuals. eit is an error component, which varies in 
time and individuals. A specific formulation of this equation, for controlling both for 
unobservable heterogeneity (αi) and for specific time effects (λt), can be estimated using the 
technique of fixed effects. These variables are expected to be stable for a short period of time. 
Instrumental Variables 
                                                 
9 See Hausman and Taylor (1981) for further information. 
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In the presence of endogeneity, having found correlation between the error term and the 
explaining part of the model, we used a model with instrumental variables. The variable that 
suffers from endogeneity must be instrumented for, so as to control for the bias. However, the 
instruments used must be non-related to the error term, but highly correlated to the variable 
being instrumented. This method allows the isolation of the endogenous variable [Arellano, M. 
and S. Bond (1991); Baum, Schaffer and S. Stillman (2003)], producing more robust 
estimations. As well discussed in literature, we also treat the variable education in our estimated 
model as being endogenous. 
iiiiiij yxw εθβα ++Σ+= ∑ln                                 (15) 
where lnwij ids the logarithm of worker`s i wage in the j labor market. α is the intercept, x 
is the vector of explaining variables and βi are the parameters to be estimated. θ represents the 
instruments in the model and εi is a random error term, independently and identically 
distributed. The model is estimated using a two stage least square.  
The Heckman Selection Model  
When solving for the sample selection bias, Heckman (1974, 1979 e 1980) proposed a 
procedure to obtaining consistent estimators. We therefore used this procedure in our labor 
income equation to correct for the bias generated in the supply and demand for labor market. 
 First, we estimated the equation for the workers’ participation on the labor market over 
vector X, by using a probit model so as to obtain δ / µi estimate. Using these estimates, we then 
obtained the inverse of Mill’s ratio (λ). We then estimated the income equation over Z, using 
Mill’s inverse ratio as explaining variable, through an OLS. The equation is given by 
iiii ZW µλδ +Θ+=  (16)   
where W is the logarithm of wage, Z is a vector or personal characteristics, δ is a vector of 
parameters and µ is a random error vector that assumes usual statistical assumptions. 
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3.4. Estimation Results 
To test the hypothesis of whether there are different returns to education among formal and 
informal labor markets in Brazil, for the 1995-2002 and 2003-2008 periods, we estimate the 
equation for participation in the labor market. This procedure makes possible identify the factors 
that affect workers’ decision of participating or not of the labor market. 
The explaining variables that we use in our model consist of, mainly, personal 
characteristics. The main personal characteristics are education (ESCOL), experience (EXP) and 
square experience (EXP2). Despite experience increases the probability for the individual to 
participate in labor force, this increase happens in a decelerated pace. The level of education 
also presents direct effect over the decision of participating on labor market. As the level of 
education increases, so does the opportunity of finding a job. Thus these are the main explaining 
variables.  
However, other personal attributes commonly appear in the literature, such as race and 
gender. Hence, we also include these variables in our model. Although decision-making to 
entering labor market is firstly related to the worker’s personal characteristics, may it be 
education, experience, race, gender or status, other variables such as kids, or whether the 
employer is formal or informal also have to be taken into account. In the appendix we present 
detailed description of the variables used in this research. 
Table 2 presents the results for the Heckman selection equation for formal and informal 
workers in both 1995-2002 and 2003-2008 periods. All the variables in the model for formal 
labor present the expected sign. However, the analogous is not true for the informal market 
model. As an example, the higher the level of education, the lower the probability of obtaining a 
job in the informal sector. As such, an increase of one year of study would reduce the 
probability in 17,7% of obtaining a job in the first period and in 20,92%, in the second. The 
results show that the increase in one year of study would raise in 16,21% the probability of 
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participating of the formal sector in the first period and for the second, this probability rises to 
22,77%. 
From Table 2, we can also conclude that urban areas benefit from the availability of 
formal working posts. As such, formal labors in urban areas had a 16,1% probability of finding a 
formal job in the 1995-2002 period. However, this probability decreased in the later period to 
12,12%. Union filiations strongly contribute to the decision of being formal or informal. Despite 
the high contribution to formality, filiations among formal workers have thoroughly decreased 
from 99,2% in the first period to 44,21%, in the 2003-2008 period, as can be seen on Table 2. 
The reduction of labor force being employed in production, combined with new managerial 
forms and great firm mobility among one and another sector, as well as the increase in temp 
jobs, have led to less union filiations. 
 
Table nº2 Heckman selection equation for formal and informal labor market for 
periods of 1995-2002 and 2003-2008. 
 1995-2002 2003-2008 
 Formal InFormal Formal InFormal 
 Coef Coef coef coef 
yostudy 0.1621*** -0.1765*** 0.2277*** -0.2092*** 
 (-0.0047) (0.00460 (0.0029) (0.0038) 
yostudy2 -0.0068*** 0.0070*** -0.0082*** 0.0080*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
age2 -0.0007*** 0.0007*** -0.0010*** 0.0009*** 
 (0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
age 0.0617*** -0.0646*** 0.0977*** -0.0891*** 
 (0.0031 (0.0032) (0.0022) (0.0025) 
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experyostudy -0.0019*** 0.0020*** -0.0025*** 0.0022*** 
 (0.0001 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
esize 1.0117*** -0.9553*** 0.9015*** -0.9645*** 
 (0.0066 (0.0067) (0.0049) (0.0052) 
kids 0.0129 -0.0106 -0.0779*** 0.0457*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0101) (0.0066) (0.0075) 
white 0.1412*** -0.1270*** 0.1168*** -0.1415*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0047) (0.0052) 
marriedM -0.0471*** 0.0388*** 0.0783*** -0.0490*** 
 (0.0077) (0.0080) (0.0051) (0.0057) 
union 0.9920*** -0.8648*** 0.4421*** -0.9224*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0110) (0.0074) (0.0086) 
pessref 0.0910*** -0.0917*** 0.0127** -0.0362*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0096) (0.0051) (0.0067) 
urban 0.1610*** -0.1882*** 0.1212*** -0.1902*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0144) (0.0086) (0.0116) 
_cons -2.2750*** 1.9080*** -3.0348*** 2.8570*** 
 (0.0645) (0.0648) (0.0459 (0.0531) 
Wald          24990.61       4994.05      76021.66       9279.85 
N                  192646        233272          343915        345985 
Rho            -.1259561      .0631848        .9120769      -.0627006 
     (.0144699)    (.0287542)    (.0015331)    (.0182216) 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
The LR chi2 tests in the adjusted models shows that all the models are significant to 
explain modifications occurred in the formal and informal labor market in the two periods under 
analysis. Observing the values of the z statistic for the four models of participation in the formal 
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and informal markets, all explaining variables, with exception to kids in the first period, are 
statistically different from zero at a 5% level of significance. Thus, we can say that each 
explaining variable statistically influences the decision of participating in the formal or informal 
labor market. 
Tables 3 and 4 present estimation results, for formal and informal workers, of all four 
methods: (1) OLS; (2) pseudo-panel with fixed effects; (3) instrumental variables; and, (4) 
Heckman selection model. While table 3 brings results for the 1995-2002 period, table 4 shows 
results for the 2003-2008 period. A common way of testing for robustness of estimations is to do 
a sensitivity analysis, in which we include changes to some coefficients that could influence 
wage-education values. As can be assessed in tables 3 and 4, in spite of the many equations and 
methods used, most of the estimated coefficients were very close to one another, as well as 
presenting the same signs.  A deeper analysis of tables 3 and 4 suggests that the estimators are 
consistent, in all four methods. They also present the expected sign, already consolidated in the 
literature. The coefficients of education and experience are always positive, while the square of 
experience is negative and its values reasonable, coherent with other values found in literature10. 
The estimated coefficients are all highly significant, at a 1% level of significance. In this 
manner, the explaining variables education, experience, square experience and education times 
experience are all consistent with human capital theory.  
It is worth pointing out some aspects of the estimated equations. For example, the OLS 
estimated coefficient of years of study for formal labor shows its importance as a stimulating 
factor to wage. The increase in one year of study positively affects formal wages in a mean of 
17,2%, for the first period and 19,8% in the second one. Returns on education for formal 
workers are greater than for informal laborers. In order to obtaining more precise information, 
we assess the second OLS equation for informality. In these results, the increase in one year of 
study corresponds to a 12,6% return over wages for the first period and 16,9% for the second, 
                                                 
10 Loureiro and Galrão (2001); Sachsida, Loureiro and Mendonça (2004). 
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when estimated by the same technique. This is in accordance with the theory that if individuals 
invest on human capital, they obtain positive returns on their investment.  
The education return in economic activity for formal and informal workers is 
characterized by great differentiation gap in the first 1995-2002 period analyzed. This means 
that allocation in the formal market is more attractive, for the existence of benefits such as 
welfare, health insurance and more stability, indicating that education is more valued in 
formality. However, this gap fell by almost half in the 2003-2008 period. Table 4 shows that 
returns to education maintained close to 21% for formality and 17,5% for informality in the 
second period of analysis. This means that, for each year of study, formal workers have at least a 
19,7% up to 22,6%, when considering all the methods used, increase in wages. For informal 
workers this return is slightly lower, ranging from 16,9% to 18,2%, among the different 
methodologies.  
The coefficient estimates for experience varied between 0,0694 a 0,0921 for the formal 
market and between 0,050 a 0,0885 for informality, among all four methodologies for either 
tables 3 and 4. Therefore, we can conclude that, due to little dispersion, the estimated data on 
experience returns are consistent. It is interesting to note that there are no significant gains for 
experience among working in formality or informality. Both value experience in very similar 
ways, in all four methodologies used. 
The lambda variable, Mill’s inverse ratio, was significant for both estimates. Thus its 
inclusion was necessary in order to eliminate tendency problems due to sample selection bias. In 
the first estimated equation for Heckman selection model, on formal workers for the 1995-2002, 
the lambda coefficient was negative and significant. This shows that non-measurable factors that 
would increase participation in the labor market, actually decreased wages for the first period. 
The other lambda coefficients are positive and statistically significant for informality in both 
cycles and for formality in the second period, indicating that these were correctly measured.  
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To be a married man in the labor market shows significant wage gains relative to non-
married men. Married men in formal markets receive a mean of 27,4% more than single men, 
when observing the Heckman selection model in column 7, table 3. In the informal market, this 
gap reduces a little, representing 24,7% higher wages for married men. In the second period the 
wage gain seems to reduce a little, but is still high, representing a 17,5%, in formality, and 
12,1%, in informality, wage surplus for marriages among men. It is interesting to note that 
values for all four methods generated similar coefficient values for each market sector: formal 
and informal.  
Assessing the impact of firm size with up to 10 employees, available on table 3, we 
observe that wages in informal markets are greater than in formal markets. One of the main 
reasons for this differentiation is due to extreme rigidity and costs imposed by labor legislation. 
The concentration occurs in small firms where the presence of informal labor is more intense. 
On table 4, we observe this same behavior among firm size for the second period. This happens 
in the OLS estimation method (19,1% for formal and 26,1% for informal) for the Pseudo-panel 
with fixed effects (17,7% formal and 24,0% informal) and for the instrumental variables method 
(17,7% formal and 24,0% informal). However, for the Heckman selection model this tendency 
inverts. Formal firms tend to be more representative in formality than in informality for the 
2003-2008 period, showing a 77% increase in formality, against a 30,8% in informality. In every 
model estimated we can verify a positive influence of being white over wages, that is, white 
people present higher wages than non-white individuals, both in formal and informal markets. In 
average, the wage gain for “white” is of almost a quarter more.  
As can be observed on tables 3 and 4, the dummy variable for kids always has a negative 
influence over wages, as was expected. They are all statistically significant at a 1% significance 
level. This shows that having children has a negative impact on labor market and revenues. 
Children represent costs ranging from 12,9% to 15,3% for formal workers and 13,1% to 16,5% 
for informal laborers in the 1995-2002 period. For the 2003-2008 period this burden for having 
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kids decreased representing a 10,4% to 11% wage reduction for informal workers and 10,5% to 
16,7% among formal workers. 
 Hence, the main difference between the 1995-2002 and 2003-2008 period is the impact 
of education over wages. Returns to education for the second cycle are greater than for the first 
period analyzed. The monetary gains for the first period vary from 16,5% to 18,2% for formality 
and from 12,2% to 14,3% for informal labor. Whereas, for the second period these gains range 
from 19,7% to 22,6% and from 16,9% to 18,2%, for formality and informality, respectively. 
According to these findings, investments made on education were more profitable for the 2003-
2008 period. However, all wage gaps between formal and informal markets reduced 
considerably. This reinforces the fact that workers are increasingly deciding in which market to 
operate.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Empirical studies on informal employment in Brazil indicate that this market has gone through 
deep changes. Emerging evidence suggests that a share of informal employment is chosen and 
may offer specific benefits and opportunities to certain individuals. In particular, depending on 
their characteristics, some individuals may have a comparative advantage to work in the 
informal sector. 
An empirical analysis was made to assess the main factors that drive the Brazilian labor 
when deciding to participate in the formal or informal sectors. In particular we’ve intended to 
observe if the game theory evolutionary model developed by Araujo and Souza (2010) is suited 
to describe the evolution of the informal market in the Brazilian economy. We used four 
different methodologies: the OLS, Pseudo-panel with fixed effects, Instrumental Variables and 
the Heckman Selection Model. The data for this study were obtained at the National Household 
Sampling Survey – PNAD/IBGE, from 1995 to 2008, with an exception to the years of 1994 and 
2000, when this survey did not occur. The cross-section data were pooled and divided in two 
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periods: 1995 – 2002 and 2003 – 2008. The sample ranges individuals from 22 to 57 years of 
age. 
Results indicate that the main difference between the 1995-2002 and 2003-2008 period is 
the impact of education over wages. Returns to education for the second period are greater than 
for the first period analyzed. The monetary gains for the first period vary from 16,5% to 18,2% 
for formality and from 12,2% to 14,3% for informal labor. Whereas, for the second period these 
gains range from 19,7% to 22,6% and from 16,9% to 18,2%, for formality and informality, 
respectively. According to these findings, investments made on education were more profitable 
for the 2003-2008 period. However, all wage gaps between formal and informal markets 
reduced considerably, which reinforces the fact that workers are increasingly deciding in which 
market to operate. In this vein we conclude that the model developed by Araujo and Souza 
(2010) provides a good description of the dynamics of the labor market when wages and tax 
schemes are taken into consideration as the key determinants of the choice of economic agents. 
However other variables such as education and skills have been pointed out as important factors 
that affect the decisions of workers and firms.    
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